This paper analyses the implications of heteroscedasticity for optimal macroeconomic policy and welfare. We …nd that changes in the variance structure driven by exogenous processes like GARCH a¤ect welfare but not the optimal feedback rule. However, changes in the variance structure driven by state-dependent processes a¤ect both. We also derive Certainty-Equivalent Transformations of state-dependent volatility models that allow standard quadratic dynamic programming algorithms to be employed to study optimal policy. These results are illustrated numerically using a reduced-form model of the U.S. economy in which changes in volatility are driven by a GARCH process and the rate of in ‡ation
Introduction
This paper explores the implications of heteroscedastic disturbances for the analysis of optimal policy. Our analysis is based on the observation that most time-varying volatility models are essentially quadratic and therefore …t nicely into the linear-quadratic framework of the optimal linear regulator problem, allowing a rigorous analysis of their policy implications.
Correspondence to: Vito Polito, Department of Economics, 3 East, University of Bath, Bath, BA2 7AY, UK. E-mail: v.polito@bath.ac.uk Three key …ndings emerge from this research. First, the certainty-equivalence (CE) principle still holds in macroeconomic models with heteroscedastic disturbances if changes in the variance structure are exogenous. Examples of this type include ARCH, GARCH or stochastic volatility processes that, like homoscedastic volatility, in ‡uence the welfare loss but not the optimal policy. Second, we …nd that when changes in the variance structure are related to the variables describing the state of the economy, the CE principle no longer holds and the speci…cation of the variance structure does in ‡uence the optimal decision rule. State-dependent models of the variance structure are extensively used in the literature on the term structure of interest rates and have been employed more recently in macroeconomic models. They allow the variance of the shocks to depend in both a linear and a quadratic way upon the state variables. The classic example is the Cox, Ingersoll and Ross (1985) square root volatility model, in which the variance depends linearly upon the nominal rate of interest. Dothan (1978) and Courtadon (1982) develop models in which the variance is a quadratic function of the interest rate. Engle (1982) uses lagged values of the regressors as a way of generalizing ARCH variance speci…cations. Recent examples of macro-…nance models with a state-dependent variance component include Spencer (2008) , Bekaert, Cho and Moreno (2010) and Campbell et al. (2014) . We show that there is a hierarchy of e¤ects if the error structure is heteroscedastic. Quadratic state dependence a¤ects all of the coe¢ cients in the optimal feedback rule, as well as welfare. Linear state dependence a¤ects the intercept of the optimal feedback rule and welfare. GARCH reinforces these state-dependent e¤ects.
However, on its own, GARCH only a¤ects welfare.
Third, we derive a Certainty-Equivalent Transformation (CET) of the heteroscedastic optimal linear regulator problem with state-dependent volatility. This uses change of variable techniques to write the problem as in the canonical homoscedastic form. This allows researchers to use standard optimal control techniques to analyze optimal policy rules and welfare losses. The transformation shows that state dependent volatility changes the e¤ec-tive welfare cost of variables like in ‡ation and interest rates that may in ‡uence volatility.
CETs of dynamic optimization problems are common in both …nance and macroeconomics. Hansen and Sargent (2008) provide a textbook description of these in the context for robust optimal control of models with dynamic misspeci…cation. Our work complements theirs by examining the e¤ect of stochastic misspeci…cation.
We illustrate the theoretical results numerically using a small-scale VAR model of the U.S. economy as a laboratory to revisit one of the most popular applications of dynamic programming in macroeconomics: the analysis of optimal monetary policy. The model is estimated by Maximum Likelihood (ML). The variance structure of the VAR includes both GARCH and in ‡ation-dependent components that are highly signi…cant statistically. This speci…cation is consistent with the Okun-Friedman-Ball hypothesis that macroeconomic uncertainty is related to the rate of in ‡ation, see Okun (1971 ), Friedman (1977 ) and Ball (1992 . Fountas, Karanasos and Kim (2002) and Caporale and Kontonikas (2009) argue that an increase in in ‡ation should lead to a monetary tightening response to limit the increase in macroeconomic volatility. Our model formalizes this proposition and provides an argument for a low in ‡ation target as well as a more aggressive response to in ‡ation shocks. 1 Our numerical results show how misspeci…cation of the variance structure can lead researchers to mismeasuring both the welfare cost of in ‡ation and the potential gains from optimization.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2, supported by Appendices A and B, sets out the general solution of the optimal linear regulator problem with heteroscedastic disturbances; shows how this depends upon the source of heteroscedasticity; and derives the CET under state dependence. Section 3, supported by Appendices B, C and D, describes the empirical application used to illustrate the theoretical results. Section 4 concludes by summarizing the …ndings of this research. Appendix F suggests extensions of the model framework and highlights avenues for future research. 2
Optimal control of heteroscedastic macroeconomic models
This section presents a general framework for optimization problems with linear-quadratic heteroscedasticity, based on the Bellman equation. This includes expectations of quadratic 1 There are arguments that point in the opposite direction, suggesting a higher target (Blanchard et al (2010) ) and a less aggressive response (Sack (2000) ).
2 Appendices are available online.
forms in the state variables, which involve both means and variances. Since the latter are linear-quadratic functions of the state variables, the value function remains quadratic and the decision rules linear.
Speci…cation
Let 2 (0; 1) be a discount factor and E t denoting mathematical expectation conditional on information available in period t. Consider a decision maker that wants to choose an in…nite sequence of controls fi t g 1 t=0 to minimize the quadratic loss function
subject to the …rst-order stochastic linear di¤erence equation
with x 0 given. In the above, x t is a n 1 vector of state or non-policy variables; i t is a q 1 vector of control or policy variables; R is a n n positive de…nite symmetric matrix;
W is anon-negative de…nite symmetric matrix; H is a n q matrix; x and i are vectors of targets of dimension n and q respectively; A is a n n matrix of coe¢ cients; B is a n q matrix of coe¢ cients; and w t+1 is a n 1 vector of independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.) random variables with mean vector zero and heteroscedastic covariance
with w 0 and 0 given. The …ve terms on the right side of (3) denote the homoscedastic, ARCH, GARCH, linear and quadratic state-dependent components of the covariance matrix respectively: K is a positive de…nite n n matrix; C, G, L and Q are n n matrices that are not necessarily symmetric. 3 The vector s and the matrix S = ss 0 select the variable(s) 3 We assume that the su¢ cient conditions for the stability of the solution to the linear regulator problem are met, namely (i) the matrices B= B CR 1 H 0 and C are stabilizable and (ii) the matrices = HR 1 H 0 and R are positive semide…nite. See Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004) , Appendix B.3, which transforms the system by removing the o¤ diagonal H terms to get B and , and pages [116] [117] [118] entering the linear and quadratic components of the covariance matrix respectively.
A wide range of macro models can be written in the form of the …rst-order stochastic linear di¤erence equation (2). For example, equation (2) can describe the non-policy part of VAR models such as those used for the measurement of macroeconomic shocks by Bernanke and Mihov (1998) ; and for optimal control by Sack (2000) and Polito and Wickens (2012) .
It encompasses the Rudebusch and Svensson's (1999) central bank model, which has been extensively employed for the analysis of U.S. monetary policy. Equation (2) is also consistent with the solution of a linear rational expectations model, as in Blanchard and Kahn (1980) for example.
Further, the speci…cation of the covariance matrix in equation (3) Campbell et al. (2014) in which volatility is linked to the output gap. Dothan (1978) and Courtadon (1982) give examples of quadratic state-dependent volatility models where the driving factor is the nominal rate of interest.
General solution
To …nd the policy function we need to express the optimal value of the original problem given arbitrary initial conditions. In a standard homoscedastic quadratic dynamic programming problem, the value function includes a constant term (for the steady-state variance) and the state vector x 0 (for any initial disequilibrium). This can also allow for linear-quadratic which then applies the stability conditions. These assumptions imply that the solutions to the homoscedastic and the GARCH optimal linear regulator problems -which are both certainty equivalent -are stable. In section 2.2.4, we use the CET to infer that the stability properties of the optimal solution are preserved under state-dependent volatility.
(LQ) terms in the dynamic speci…cation of the variance structure. The presence of ARCH and GARCH terms in (3) implies that the value function depends also on the initial values for w 0 and 0 . Thus we try a value function of the form:
where k is a scalar; P is a n n positive semide…nite symmetric matrix, p, c and g are n 1
vectors. 4 After using the transition law (2) and the covariance matrix (3) to eliminate next period's states in (1), taking expectations and recognizing that the vector w is orthogonal to x and i, the Bellman equation becomes:
where
The …rst line in the Bellman equation shows the terms found in a standard homoscedastic problem; the next two lines arise if there are ARCH or GARCH terms in the covariance structure; the fourth line shows the e¤ect of state-dependent components and the last line shows the interaction if both of these e¤ects are present. The …rst-order necessary condition for the minimum problem on the right side of equation (5) yields the optimal linear feedback rule for the policy vector i:
After substituting the trial solution (4) into the left side of equation (5) and the optimizer (6) - (8) into the right side, collection of the coe¢ cients for the quadratic terms in x and those for w and gives:
Equating the coe¢ cients for the linear terms gives
while collecting the constant terms gives
Equation (9) is a matrix Riccati di¤erence equation for the symmetric matrix P, while (10) and (11) are discrete Lyapunov equations for the square matrices gg 0 and cc 0 respectively. This system can be solved by numerical iteration, starting from initial values for P, g and c. This is recursive: given the solution for P in (9) the solutions for g and c are obtained by joint numerical iteration of (10) and (11). Substituting P, g and c into (12) and (13) then gives the solutions for p and k.
Equations (6) to (13) show the solution to the heteroscedastic optimal control problem.
This encompasses a number of special cases that are now discussed separately to highlight how alternative speci…cations of the variance structure might alter the optimal feedback rule. 5
Homoscedastic variance
If the variance structure is homoscedastic then equation (3) (6) - (8), but with:
and
The solutionsP andp are independent of the variance structure, therefore implying that the optimal feedback rule satis…es the CE principle.
GARCH variance
When the variance structure is driven by a GARCH process, equation (3) reduces to t+1 =
The trial solution is given by (4), being di¤erent from that used for the homoscedastic case. The Bellman equation in (5) does not include the last two lines since the matrices L and Q are both equal to zero matrices. The solutions for P and p are still given by the equations (14) and (15). Thus the policy rule is as in the homoscedastic case.
5 Appendix A provides more details on the computation of the solution in equations (6) to (13).
This result shows that under GARCH volatility the CE principle still holds, since the feedback rule in equations (6) - (8) is identical to the decision rule for the corresponding nonstochastic linear regulator problem. 6 Consequently the conditions su¢ cient for the stability of the solution to the homoscedastic optimal control problem are also su¢ cient for the stability of the solution with GARCH. This however a¤ects welfare. Relative to the homoscedastic case, the value function (4) includes the non-negative terms g 0 ww 0 g and c 0 c. In addition, the constant k changes under GARCH, as it includes the positive term (g 0 Kg + c 0 Kc) that increases the welfare loss because K is positive de…nite.
State dependence
The CE principle no longer holds if the variance structure includes linear and quadratic state-dependent components. Comparing (12) with (15) we can see that linear state dependence means that the last term in the square brackets on the right side of equation (12) is not zero. This shifts p and hence the intercepts f in the optimal feedback rule through (7). This shift is the sum of two e¤ects. The …rst is direct, working through the term 1 2 tr (PL) s that occurs whenever there is linear state dependence in the variance structure. The second term 1 2 (c 0 Lc + g 0 Lg) s is a secondary e¤ect that arises only when there is both GARCH and linear state dependence. Importantly, because L does not appear in the solution for P given by equations (9) -(11), linear state dependence does not a¤ect the response coe¢ cients F in (8). However, it a¤ects the welfare loss from (4) as it changes p and consequently the constant term k in (13).
The impact of quadratic state dependence can be seen by comparing the solutions for P in equations (9) and (14). Under quadratic dependence, the term Q is no longer zero. This adds three extra terms on the right side of P in equations (9). The …rst, 1 2 tr (PQ) S, is a direct e¤ect that occurs whenever there is quadratic state dependence. The next two terms, c 0 QcS and g 0 QgS, show a secondary e¤ect on the response coe¢ cients that occurs if there are both quadratic and GARCH components in the variance structure. Since PQ is positive semi-de…nite, and c 0 Qc and g 0 Qg are non-negative, these three terms are non-negative. They shift P through (9) and therefore p through (12). This a¤ects the coe¢ cients f and F in the optimal feedback rule through (7) and (8) and hence the welfare loss through (4).
In summary, there is a hierarchy of e¤ects if the error structure is heteroscedastic.
Quadratic state dependence a¤ects all the coe¢ cients in the optimal feedback rule as well as welfare. Linear state dependence a¤ects the intercept of the optimal feedback rule and welfare. GARCH can reinforce these e¤ects, but on its own this only a¤ects welfare.
The Certainty-Equivalent Transform (CET)
Although the CE principle does not hold under linear-quadratic state-dependent volatility, a CET of the Bellman equation can be obtained by appropriately consolidating the linear and quadratic terms of the variance structure with the linear and quadratic terms in the objective function of the decision maker. This allows the value function to be expressed in the canonical homoscedastic form. Standard dynamic programming algorithms can then be used to solve problems that do not satisfy CE. We derive the CET for the general case of the heteroscedastic variance structure in equation (3).
The Bellman equation (5) can be re-parametrized in a certainty-equivalent form by setting L and Q to zero and replacing the welfare parameters R, x , i in (1) and k in (4) with e R, e x , e i and e k to obtain the re-parametrized objective function:
It then follows that the trial solution can be expressed as
and the certainty-equivalent Bellman equation can be written as:
+ e k+I+ tr(( e PC 0 ww 0 C)+ tr( e PG 0 G)
where I still de…ned as in section 2.2, with e P and e p replacing P and p respectively. Equation (18) shows that after transformation the Bellman equation has the same structure as in the GARCH model and thus satis…es the CE principle.
Appendix B derives the CET and shows that the Bellman equations in (5) and (18) are mathematically equivalent. Di¤erentiation of (18) with respect to the vector of policy instruments i yields the feedback rule (6) but with coe¢ cients determined as:
where:
The solution to the transformed problem is equivalent to that in equations (6) to (13). The de…nition of e R implies that the solution for P from (9) is the same as the solution for e P from (21). Thus e F = F. The equality between p and e p is shown by replacing e x and e i in 
where 0 , 1 and 2 are 3 3 real and symmetric matrices; M and N are 3 3 real and diagonal matrices; s 0 = h 0 1 0 i so that z 0 t s = t ; and z 0 t Sz t = 2 t (since S = ss 0 ).
Equation (24) describes an encompassing (EN ) model of the variance structure that
nests four alternative models of volatility: the homoscedastic (HO) model ( t = 0 ); the linear-dependence (LN ) model ( t+1 = 0 + 1 z 0 t s); the linear-quadratic (LQ) model ( t+1 = 0 + 1 z 0 t s+ 2 z 0 t Sz t ); and the pure GARCH (GH) model ( t+1 = 0 +Me t e 0 t M 0 +N t N 0 ). The unconditional covariance matrix of the residuals is determined from the unconditional expectations on the right side of (24), as explained in Appendix C.1. Since is a real symmetric positive de…nite matrix, the triangular factorization = TDT 0 applies, where T is a 3 3 lower triangular matrix with u , ru and r being the o¤-diagonal items and D is a 3 3 diagonal matrix with uu , and rr in the main diagonal.
Optimal monetary policy
The Fed chooses the sequence fr t g 1 t=0 that minimizes the loss function
where u 2 t , 2 and ( r) 2 are the volatility of unemployment, in ‡ation and changes in the policy instrument; while u , and r are weights attached to each of the three goals respectively. 8 The optimization is subject to the constraints described by the non-policy block of the VAR in equations (23) The re-parametrization, based on the solution in Appendix B, illustrates the e¤ect of GARCH and state-dependent volatility on the optimal feedback rule. The term tr(PQ) 0, due to the presence of quadratic dependence in (24) The optimal feedback rule can be combined with the non-policy block equations to study the dynamic of the VAR model under the optimal policy. We denote the VAR models under the optimal feedback rule as HO , LN , LQ , GH , EN . 9
We write the steady-state solution to the policy rate equation as r = + u u+ , with , u and denoting the long-run coe¢ cients of the policy rule. In particular, = 0 for models based on mean-adjusted data, but can be non-zero when the steady-state is shifted by the linear dependence e¤ect under the optimal rule. With r = = and u = 0 we have = =(1 ), where the denominator is negative under the Taylor principle requiring > 1, see Woodford (2003) . This de…nes the stationary rate of in ‡ation implicit in the long-run solution of the empirical and optimal feedback rule.
Maximum likelihood estimation
The VAR model in equations (23) and (24) is estimated by ML. First, we estimate the parameters in (24) while …xing the parameters 1 and 2 of the transition system (23) at their OLS values. This gives estimates for the homoscedastic model HO and four heteroscedastic models, labelled as LN X; LQX, GHX and EN X respectively. Next, we re-estimate all the parameters in (23) and (24) simultaneously. 10 Panels A and B in Table 1 show the likelihood statistics from the ML estimates. Under the log-likelihood ratio (LR) test, all restricted models are rejected at the 5 per cent signi…cance level against the unrestricted EN X model. To guard against over-…tting, Table 1 also reports the di¤erence in the Schwarz approximation to the Posterior Odds ratio (SCA)
proposed by Canova (2007) . Under this criterion only the HO model is rejected against the EN X model. Panel B shows that simultaneous estimation of all parameters in equations (23) and (24) produces a further, though modest, improvement in …t.
Panels C and D in Table 1 report the coe¢ cients of the unconditional covariance matrix of the VAR innovations, , implied by the ML estimates. The di¤erences in the unconditional variances across models are important in understanding the welfare results reported in Section 3.5. Model LQX delivers the lowest unconditional variances for all three variables. This is particularly evident for the unconditional variance of (orthogonalized) interest rate shocks, rr . Consequently, the unconditional variances are also low under the EN (EN X) model. The unconditional covariances are relatively stable across alternative speci…cations of the variance structure. In most cases, the GARCH model yields marginally lower estimates of the unconditional covariances than the other models. Table 2 reports the long-run coe¢ cients of the interest rate equation and the rate of in ‡ation described in section 3.2. The …rst column of numbers (headed 'Empirical') reports the estimates from the empirical policy rule. With the exception of model EN; these are by construction the same for all these models. The remaining columns (headed 'Optimal') report the coe¢ cients for the long-run optimal feedback rule. We consider four di¤erent sets of welfare weights. The …rst gives equal weight to the three goal variables. The others show the e¤ect of halving the weight on each goal variable.
The optimal policy rule
Reading across Table 2 shows the e¤ect of moving from the empirical to the optimal rule under di¤erent welfare speci…cations. Reading down this table shows the e¤ect of di¤erent models of volatility on the policy rule, to illustrate the theoretical …ndings of section 2.
We highlight the following results. First, optimization of model HO to get HO increases the response coe¢ cients, with changes in the the optimal rule being consistent with the alternative speci…cations of the welfare weights. Second, the policy rule coe¢ cients from model GHX are the same as in HO , since GARCH satis…es CE. Third, linear dependence introduces a positive intercept ( ) into the interest rate equation of model LN X , thereby reducing steady-state in ‡ation ( ), while leaving the optimal response coe¢ cients unchanged relative to models HO and GHX : Fourth, in the LQX model, quadratic dependence also makes policy more responsive to in ‡ation. The shift in is slightly larger than in LN X , leading to lower steady-state in ‡ation. Fifth, the coe¢ cients from model EN X are very similar to those in model LQX ; and the intercepts are only marginally higher. Thus the secondary e¤ects of including GARCH as well as state-dependent volatility appear to be empirically small. 11 Six, comparison of the results for EN X and EN shows that re-estimating the transmission coe¢ cients has little e¤ect on the long-run policy rule. Table 3 shows how heteroscedasticity a¤ects the measurement of welfare by reporting the losses obtained from the stochastic simulation of the six models. 12 The analysis is presented along three di¤erent dimensions. The …rst column of numbers illustrates how heteroscedasticity a¤ects welfare under the empirical rule. The third column of numbers shows the e¤ects under the optimal policy rule. The last column shows the welfare gains from the optimization of policy. In parenthesis we report the welfare changes due to di¤erent variance structures relative to the homoscedastic model.
Welfare analysis
The …rst column shows that GARCH (GHX) and linear dependence (LN X) increase the loss, while the quadratic e¤ect reduces it. The lowest loss occurs for model LQX, consistent with the observation in section 3.3 that this is less sensitive to interest rate shocks than other models. The comparison of models HO and GHX suggests that adding GARCH to model HO is broadly the same as adding GARCH to model HO. 13 There is nothing policy can do about the increase in variability, the variance of one goal variable can only be traded o¤ against that of another. In LN X however, policy can reduce the overall volatility of the system by reducing the steady-state rate of in ‡ation (as shown in Table 2 ). This mitigates the e¤ect of introducing linear state-dependent heteroscedasticity. 14 Introducing quadratic state dependence into the empirical model lowers the welfare loss (about 4% on average across the four sets of welfare weights), but this reduction is greater (about 13% on average) under the optimal rule. It achieves this by combining a reduction in steady-state in ‡ation with a more aggressive policy stance.
The last column shows that the gain from optimization is generally higher when allowing for in ‡ation-conditional volatility in the variance structure. In model LN X it is optimal to lower the steady-state in ‡ation rate, thereby shifting the trade-o¤ and reducing the overall volatility of the system. This makes the optimization gain bigger than in the standard homoscedastic model, where the gain only re ‡ects increase in the level of aggression in the systematic response of policy. 15 The LQX model, which combines a shift in the steady state with a more aggressive stance, gives an average welfare gain across the four speci…cations of preferences that is almost twice that implied by model HO . The welfare gains from the optimization of model GHX are broadly the same as under model HO, since both satisfy the CE principle. Models EN X and EN lead to an average welfare improvement, between 30-45 per cent, that is still higher than that from the optimization of the HO and GHX models.
The numerical analysis is based on a reduced-form model. In this respect, we followed a large literature on the implications of changes in monetary policy for macroeconomic dynamics and welfare also based on reduced-form models like ours. Examples include Bernanke and Mihov (1998) , Sack (2000) , Zha (2006a, 2006b ) and Polito and Wickens (2012) .
Reduced-form models are subject to the Lucas (1976) critique that the transition mechanism in the economy is in theory not invariant to policy changes. 16 The empirical relevance of this observation is however still debated. Our VAR model is based on Primiceri (2005) who …nds no signi…cant changes in the responses of in ‡ation and unemployment to the policy rate under Burns, Volcker and Greenspan chairmanships of the Fed. Zha (2006a, 2006b) An alternative is to use a structural model like that of Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) that is less vulnerable to the Lucas critique. However, structural models employ dynamic restrictions which could induce heteroscedasticity through misspeci…cation. Nevertheless, companion papers for the U.S., Polito and Spencer (2011a) , and for the U.K., Polito and Spencer (2011b) , give results based on Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) that are similar to those reported here, thus suggesting that these …ndings are likely to be robust across a wider range of models.
Conclusion
It is well known that the optimal feedback rule satis…es CE if volatility is homoscedastic. We show that this result also holds in any model in which the source of change in the variance structure is exogenous. However, volatility can also be state dependent. The CE principle no longer holds if changes in the variance structure are endogenously driven, because volatility a¤ects welfare and state dependence puts the policy maker in a position to in ‡uence this.
We show that if the variance structure is linear-quadratic, a CET of the optimal linear regulator problem can be obtained so that it resembles a standard homoscedastic model problem. This allows the researcher to use the algorithms and insights provided by existing methodologies.
Optimization under state-dependent volatility brings two main e¤ects. Linear state dependence a¤ects the overall variance of the system by shifting its steady state, while quadratic dependence changes the systematic component of policy. These two e¤ects are mathematically equivalent to changes in the targets and welfare weights in the homoscedastic linear regulator problem. If GARCH is also present, this has the e¤ect of amplifying these shifts. Note: the long-run interest rate rule is r = + u u + . The intercept is zero for all models under the empirical rule since the data is de-meaned prior to estimation and optimization, and also for models HO and GHX since these are certainty equivalent. Linear-dependence in the variance structure has the e¤ect of inducing a positive intercept in the optimal feedback rule; this reduces the steady-state in ‡ation rate by = =(1 ) in models LN X , LQX , EN X and EN . The loss function is described in section 3.2; u , and r are weights attached to unemployment, in ‡ation and changes in the rate of interest volatility respectively. 
